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Note 
POLYGAMY AS A RED HERRING  
IN THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE 
RUTH K. KHALSA 
INTRODUCTION 
Critics of same-sex marriage have argued that if same-sex 
marriage is legalized, then eventually polygamy and other currently 
prohibited sexual relationships, such as bestiality and incest, will be 
legalized as well. The polygamy issue received increased attention 
during the 1996 congressional hearings1 on the Defense of Marriage 
Act.2 Representative Bob Inglis of South Carolina asked, “If a person 
had an ‘insatiable desire’ to marry more than one wife . . . what 
argument did gay activists have to deny him a legal, polygamous 
marriage?”3 That same year, the Supreme Court decided Romer v. 
Evans,4 holding unconstitutional a Colorado state amendment that 
would have repealed existing city ordinances prohibiting 
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 1. Professor Hadley Arkes stated that:  
[I]f marriage . . . could mean just anything the positive law proclaimed it to mean, 
then the positive law could define just about anything as a marriage. . . . [W]hy 
shouldn’t it be possible to permit a mature woman, past child bearing, to marry her 
grown son? In fact, why would it not be possible to permit a man, much taken with 
himself, to marry himself? . . . [Although] I am not predicting that, if gay marriage 
were allowed, we would be engulfed by incest and polygamy[,] . . . [w]hat is being 
posed here is a question of principle: [w]hat is the ground on which the law would 
turn back these challenges?  
Defense of Marriage Act: Hearings on H.R. 3396 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary , 104th Cong. 97–102 (1996) (statement of Hadley Arkes, professor of 
jurisprudence and American institutions, Amherst College). 
 2. Pub. L. 104–199, 100 Stat. 2419 (Sept. 21, 1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) and 28 
U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)). 
 3. Andrew Sullivan, Three’s a Crowd, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 17, 1996, at 10 
(attributing this remark to Representative Bob Inglis of South Carolina during hearings by the 
House Subcommittee on the Constitution). 
 4. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  
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discrimination based on sexual orientation.5 A lengthy dissent in that 
case elaborated more fully on Representative Inglis’ concern, noting 
that in spite of the Court’s equal protection analysis of sexual-
orientation-based discrimination, “the proposition that polygamy can 
be criminalized, and those engaging in that crime deprived of the 
vote, remains good law.”6 To the dissenters, this proposition and the 
holding of Romer seemed irreconcilable: “Has the Court concluded 
that the perceived social harm of polygamy is a ‘legitimate concern of 
government,’ and the perceived social harm of homosexuality is 
not?”7 
With the Supreme Court’s recent revisitation of the 
constitutionality of laws regulating sexual behavior in Lawrence v. 
Texas,8 the polygamy issue has again been raised, this time by 
politicians, scholars, and pundits.9 As if to demonstrate that the 
polygamy references are not merely trivial excursions onto the 
“slippery slope,” attorneys for Utah polygamists, appealing from 
convictions for bigamy, invoked the individual autonomy and right-
to-privacy rationales of Lawrence.10 Attorneys for the convicted 
 
 5. Id. at 635–36. 
 6. Id. at 650 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Over a century earlier, in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 
333 (1890), the Court had upheld an Idaho statute denying the vote to practicing polygamists. 
Polygamists had challenged the constitutionality of the statute on free exercise grounds. Id. at 
345 (“While legislation for the establishment of a religion is forbidden, and its free exercise 
permitted, it does not follow that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. Crime is 
not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as ‘religion.’”); 
see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165–66 (1878) (holding that criminal prohibition 
of polygamy is not unconstitutional). 
 7. Romer, 517 U.S. at 651 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Davis Court had based its holding 
largely on social science evidence that bigamy and polygamy “tend to destroy the purity of the 
marriage relation, to disturb the peace of families, to degrade woman, and to debase man. Few 
crimes are more pernicious to the best interests of society . . . .” Davis, 133 U.S. at 341. 
 8. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 9. See, e.g., Alan Cooperman, Santorum Angers Gay Rights Groups, WASH. POST, Apr. 
22, 2003, at A4 (“If the Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual [gay] sex 
within your home, then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have 
the right to incest, you have the right to adultery. You have the right to anything.” (quoting 
Interview by Associated Press with Senator Rick Santorum, Pennsylvania (April 7, 2003))); 
George Will, Preserving the States of Marriage, NEWS & OBSERVER, Nov. 30, 2003, at A27; 
Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/2003_11_16_volokh_ 
archive.html#106919249326450915 (Nov. 22, 2003, 12:34 EST) (“[C]oncerns that the 
Massachusetts homosexual marriage decision may lead to legalization of . . . even polygamous 
marriages seem . . . quite plausible.”). 
 10. State of Utah v. Green, 99 P.3d 820 (Utah 2004); see also Pamela Manson, Ban on 
Plural Marriage Questioned, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Feb. 4, 2005, at A1 (reporting on oral 
argument of convicted bigamist Rodney Holm’s appeal to the Utah Supreme Court). 
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polygamists contended “that the[] [appellants] have a liberty type of 
right in their relationship,”11 and that “the state is not able to show” a 
sufficiently “compelling state interest” to warrant banning 
polygamy.12 Brian Barnard, a Salt Lake City attorney who supported 
the polygamists’ appeal through the Utah Civil Rights & Liberties 
Foundation, echoed Lawrence’s dissent, referring to such arguments 
for legalization of polygamy as “another logical step” in the 
progression of the privacy rationale.13 
Is there a legally defensible solution that allows same-sex 
marriage and traditional heterosexual unions while simultaneously 
restricting polygamy? Several proponents of same-sex marriage 
contend that there is and emphasize important differences between 
dyadic unions and polygamous arrangements.14 Others waver on the 
issue, suggesting that perhaps the marriage debate should not 
categorically exclude the polygamy issue or, alternately, that 
legalizing polygamy could itself prove to be a worthy objective.15 
 
 11. Pamela Manson, Appeals Seek Polygamy Rig ht; Green, Holm Challenge Convictions 
Based on Sodomy Ruling, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Dec. 15, 2003, at C1 (a ttributing this 
comment to Rodney Parker, attorney for Rodney Holm).  
 12. Id. (attributing this comment to John Bucher, attorney for Tom Green).  
 13. Id. Mitchell Katine, a Houston attorney who represented the plaintiffs in Lawrence, 
pointed out the Lawrence Court’s focus on “whether there [i]s a rational basis, beyond moral 
disapproval, to ban [consensual behavior between adults]” and agreed that the decision could 
pave the way for future challenges to antipolygamy laws. Id. 
 14. See James M. Donovan, Rock-Salting the Slippery Slope: Why Same-Sex Marriage is 
Not a Commitment to Polygamous Marriage, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 521, 560 (2002) (arguing that the 
Western companionate notion of romantic love “is by design incompatible with polygamy 
[because] ‘at its deepest level, [polygamy] was a fundamental protest against the careless 
individualism of romantic love’” and that “[i]f this point can be sustained, romantic love can 
mark the boundary between same-sex ma rriage and polygamy” (quoting E. J. GRAFF, WHAT IS 
MARRIAGE FOR? 174 (1999))); see also Jonathan Rauch, Marrying Somebody , in SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 285, 287 (Andrew Sullivan ed., rev. ed. 2004) (“The purpose of 
secular marriage . . . is to bond as many people as possible into committed, stable 
relationships. . . . Polygamy radically undermines this goal, because . . . . [it leads to a situation in 
which] many low-status males end up unable to wed and dangerously restless.”). Rauch further 
asserts that “a society can sanction polygamy only  . . . [by using] harsh measures to repress 
a[n] . . . underclass of spouseless men.” Id. at 287. Rauch concludes that “the one-partner-each 
rule stands at the very core of a liberal society, by making marriage a goal that everyone can 
aspire to. . . . [and that is therefore] fully in keeping with liberalism’s inclusive aspirations.” Id. 
However, according to Rauch, “[p]olygamy absolutely is not.” Id. 
 15. See David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 
79–82 (1997) (arguing that “supporters of gay marriage are simply wrong to claim that gay 
peoples’ need for a union with another person of the same sex is more compelling tha n the 
needs of others who already have a spouse and who want to add a second or a third”). 
Chambers favors “a move to legalize plural ma rriages . . . unless they genuinely pose[] 
significant harms. ” Id. at 82. However, as this Note will suggest, such assertions fail to recognize 
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This Note argues that the polygamy issue is not relevant to the 
debate over whether marriage should be redefined to include same-
sex unions. By examining the assumptions informing the American 
understanding of the purpose of marriage, this Note demonstrates 
that dyadic partnerships—whether heterosexual or homosexual—
serve a different normative purpose than polygamous relationships 
and that these different purposes are mutually exclusive. Recent case 
law not only confirms this fundamental difference but indicates a 
clear preference for dyadic relationships. 
Part I of this Note sets forth an analytic framework for 
understanding the central arguments on each side of the cultural 
debate. Drawing on Judge Richard Posner’s theory16 that societies 
configure their normative marital units to promote rational policy 
choices, Part I identifies three possible normative models of marriage: 
one purely procreative, another purely companionate, and a third, 
hybrid model that combines certain aspects of the other two. A 
society’s decision to implement a particular normative model is a 
function of two variables: the relative degree of economic equality 
between genders and the presence or absence of an expectation of an 
emotional bond between partners. Historically, American culture has 
promoted a hybrid model in which aspects of the companionate ideal 
have been grafted onto an older, procreative norm. 
Part II examines two recent cases17 through the lens of this 
analytic framework. This analysis suggests that courts are shifting 
away from a hybrid-model understanding of the purpose of marriage 
and toward a purely-companionate norm that subordinates 
procreative economics to the individual’s liberty interest. Ultimately, 
Part II concludes that although same-sex marriage may be compatible 
with the evolving companionate norm, polygamy is fundamentally 
 
the importance of distinguishing between the more abstract goals of society’s democratic 
model—which depend on development of individuality and are therefore not furthered by 
polygamous arrangements—and the goals of an exclusively procreative-focused social model—
which are concretely oriented toward economic survival and communitarian focus. Arguments 
failing to recognize this distinction, instead of attempting to answer the polygamy question, 
either imply that marriage serves little or no social purpose in Western culture and could 
therefore be abolished with few adverse consequences, or ignore the well-documented harms 
that are associated with the practice of polygamy. 
 16. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992). 
 17. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
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antithetical to the principles informing the institutional purpose of 
marriage in American society and therefore unlikely to be legalized. 
I.  THREE NORMATIVE MODELS OF MARRIAGE 
Before the debate about redefining marriage became such a 
prominent legal and social issue, Judge Richard Posner argued that 
society’s choices in regulating this behavior are rational responses to 
environmental stimuli such as social and historical conditions.18 
Several aspects of Posner’s “economic theory of sexuality”19 are 
useful in analyzing the polygamy issue. First, Posner assumes that the 
best starting point for understanding social regulation of human 
sexuality is one of “moral indifference.”20 Although the libertarian-
leaning standard of moral indifference should be distinguished from 
the “equal protection/injustice” arguments for expanding the 
definition of marriage, the two share the fundamental premise of 
individual autonomy as a normative starting point for determining the 
appropriate contours of social regulation of sexual behavior.21 
Posner’s libertarianism enshrines individual autonomy as a normative 
premise, considering “[g]overnment interference with adult 
consensual activities . . . unjustified unless it can be shown to be 
necessary for the protection of the liberty or property of other 
 
 18. Judge Posner’s argument has been described as “an attempt . . . to prove the absolute 
universality of economic reasoning in human choice and behavior by showing the rationality of 
our presumably most irrational choices and behaviors: those driven by our sexual urges.” Robin 
West, Sex, Reason, and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO. L. J. 2413, 2414 (1993).  
 19. POSNER, supra  note 16, at 3. 
 20. Id. at 85. Posner sees moral indifference—essentially moral neutrality—as an optimal 
starting point for understanding social regulation of sexual behavior because it focuses not on 
content but on the efficiency-based objective of satisfying as many sexual preferences as 
possible while minimizing their costs. See id. at 181 (“[A] laissez-faire approach to sex . . . [that] 
treat[s] sex as morally indifferent . . . limit[s] sexual freedom only to the extent required by 
economic or other utilitarian considerations.”). As one critic has pointed out, despite admitting 
that his “assumption that efficiency should guide public policy is contestable,” Posner neither 
critiques nor questions the normative value of the efficiency premise. West, supra note 18, at 
2422–23 n.45 (quoting  RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 214 (1992)). In keeping with his 
premise of moral indifference, Posner analogizes sexual preferences to ice cream flavors: while 
some people prefer chocolate ice cream, others prefer vanilla. POSNER, supra  note 16, at 436. 
Sexual orientation is simply another manifestation of individual preference, not “something that 
is chosen, any more than one chooses to prefer vanilla to chocolate ice cream.” Id. 
 21. See POSNER, supra  note 16, at 3 (explaining that his economic theory should not be 
confused with “either libertine or modern liberal . . . theor[ies] of sexual regulation”); cf. West, 
supra note 18, at 2426 n.56 (“Posner goes to some lengths to distinguish his . . . argument from 
liberal arguments for sexual autonomy, which he regards as a species of ‘moral’ arguments.”). 
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persons.”22 Posner further suggests that although societies may share 
similar policy goals23 in regulating sexual behavior, two cultural 
variables—economic equality and the prevailing cultural norm 
regarding the purpose of marriage (companionate24 or 
noncompanionate)—determine whether policies are heavily 
regulatory, or relatively permissive, of sexual behavior.25 
 
 22. POSNER, supra note 16, at 3. In its focus on individual preference, the ice cream 
analogy at note 20, supra, reveals the pedigree of the “moral indifference” premise as another 
variant of the right-to-privacy-themed holdings of the Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), line of cases. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 
(finding a constitutional right to privacy in the “penumbra ” of the Bill of Rights); Eisenstadt, 
405 U.S. at 446–55 (using an equal protection rationale to extend the holding of Griswold). 
Although Posner’s analogy of ice cream preferences is rooted in the principle of individual 
autonomy, the broader social goal of economic efficiency remains the premise of his arg ument. 
POSNER, supra note 16, at 436. Written before Lawrence declared laws criminalizing private, 
consensual sexual transactions to be  unconstitutional, commentators hailed Posner’s approach 
as offering a strong argument against antisodomy laws such as the one upheld in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See, e.g., West, supra note 18, at 2426 (“The economic approach 
to sexuality presents a strong argument, then, for the decriminalization of homosexual 
conduct.”). 
 23. One commentator suggests that the most central of these shared policy objectives is 
“the economically rational purpose of ensuring the well-being of children.” West, supra note 18, 
at 2451. Children are, of course, “an ‘externality’ of sex.” Id. As an externality, however, they 
play a dual economic role in society, being at once a drain on resources because of their inability 
to support themselves, and a potential asset because they ensure the preservation and 
continuation of the culture and population group. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 187 (referring 
to the “external effects of sexual activity on children” as “the most important to consider,” and 
identifying these effects as “first having to do with the welfare of children, [and] . . . second, with 
the size and quality of the population”). Posner apparently accepts preservation of the species 
as an appropriate normative goal because he argues that, in the absence of scarcity or other 
extenuating economic factors, “there is no strong economic argument for either pronatalist or 
antinatalist policies.” Id. at 196. For a detailed discussion of the economic centrality of the 
child’s role in the evolution of social structure, see generally ROBIN FOX, KINSHIP AND 
MARRIAGE (1967). 
 24. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 45 (defining “companionate” marriage as “marriage 
between at least approximate equals, based on mutual respect and affection, and involving close 
and continuous association in child rearing, household ma nagement, and other activities”). 
 25. See id. at 177 (“Changes in women’s [economic] roles produce a movement to 
companionate marriage which in turn produces changes in sexual morality.”); see also id. at  
184–85 (contrasting the low cost and consequent permissive regulation of “[a]dultery by the 
husband . . . in a noncompanionate marriage” with the higher costs and consequent 
“disapproval of male adultery”—leading to a more restrictive regulatory approach—in societies 
promoting the norm of “companionate ma rriage”). However, even when companionate 
marriage is the norm, Posner theorizes that a “social safety net” which “ensures the survival of 
children who have no father to support them” so reduces the costs of adultery that it “stimulates 
nonmarital sexual activity by men as well as by women.” Id. at 185. Therefore, Posner suggests 
that “laws against adultery [as well as] . . . laws against prostitution . . . be viewed as measures 
for the protection of children.” Id. at 186. Although his thesis requires postulating an economic 
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Taken as a whole, these principles suggest three normative 
models of marriage, each deriving a distinctive character according to 
the following variables: whether the normative purpose of marriage in 
that culture is companionate or noncompanionate, the degree to 
which children are economically dependent on the survival of the 
marital unit,26 and the society’s resultant regulatory approach to 
sexual behavior.27 The underlying policy rationale for all three 
models’ regulatory approaches remains the same, namely, society’s 
interest in maximizing its own welfare.28 However, societies in each 
model configure their regulatory approaches to accommodate varying 
degrees of economic inequality29 or dependence30 and to promote a 
 
rationale for most regulation of sexual behavior, Posner recognizes that not “all sex laws can be 
explained on either efficiency or distributive grounds.” Id. at 217. 
 26. This element takes into consideration both the economic dependence or independence 
of women and the State’s relative generosity in making social welfare appropriations. See id. at 
174 (“[I]f the woman’s role is . . . enlarged to include . . . employment, then while . . . 
marriages . . . will be companionate, there will be fewer marriages; other forms of sexual 
relationship will no longer seem . . . so abnormal; and policies designed to foster . . . virginity 
and marital chastity for the sake of companionate marriage will lose . . . their point.”); id. at 
185–86 (discussing the regulatory and behavioral implications of “a generous social safety net 
[that] ensure[s] the survival of children who have no father to support them”); id. at 266 
(attributing social policies that heavily regulate sexual behavior to the risk of “diminution in the 
resources invested in the child” that inheres in systems characterized by economic inequality 
between the sexes). Posner illustrates this aspect of his theory by comparing the sexual mores, 
rates of female employment, and social welfare systems of Sweden with those of the U.S. Id. at 
175–80, 265–66. 
 27. Technically, this element would be part of the economic dependence analysis, but this 
Note identifies it separately in the interest of clarity. See id. at 157 (elaborating on the  theory of 
the relationship between social regulatory policy and economic dependence on the marital 
unit). 
 28. See id. at 438 (conceding, as one limitation of an economic analysis, “that economics 
does not delimit the community whose welfare is to be maximized”). As discussed in note 23, 
supra, one of the most important aspects of this overall objective is society’s interest in self-
preservation, providing a fundamentally rational economic interest in providing for the survival 
of its next generation that encompasses more than a mere “state interest in ensuring the welfare 
of the child.” West, supra note 18, at 2451. While the latter, on its face, would appear vulnerable 
to attack as a display of altruism on the part of the State, the former conforms to Posner’s moral 
indifference libertarian premise. In the interest of clarity (and recognizing the risks of 
oversimplification), this Note will often use the child’s economic well-being as a shorthand term 
for the more fundamental state interest in self-preservation. 
 29. Inequality refers to differences in market participation between women and men as 
well as to unequal regulation of sexual behavior due to gender. See also supra note 26 and 
accompanying text. 
 30. Dependence refers to the degree to which the child’s economic well-being or survival 
hinges on the continuation of the marital unit. See also supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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particular normative ideal (companionate or noncompanionate).31 
Accordingly, regulation of extra- or non-marital sexual behavior is 
based on how much of a threat such behavior poses to the stability of 
the family, and by extension, the magnitude of third-party effects it 
may produce.32 This Note will distinguish among the three models by 
reference to the normative purpose of marriage that each  
promotes, namely, marriage-for-procreation-alone, marriage-for-
companionship,33 or marriage-for-procreation-plus-companionship. 
Because this last model combines various features of both the others, 
it will be referred to as the “hybrid model.” 
A. The Procreative Model 
The procreation-only model of marriage has seen more 
widespread use than the other two, appearing from ancient times34 to 
 
 31. Although Posner devotes considerable attention to a comparative discussion of various 
forms of regulating sexual behavior, the three most salient forms of such regulation are policies 
discouraging nonmarital sex, restrictions on marrying, and policies relating to divorce. See, e.g., 
POSNER, supra  note 16, at 244–45 (“[F]or the idea of marriage as the only legitimate channel for 
sexual activity to have substance . . . [requires placing certain] restrictions on freedom of 
contract.”). In predominately procreative societies, in which the primary impact of divorce is on 
the woman’s economic security, methods of regulating nonmarital sex may be as simple as using 
customs like brideprice or dower to enforce marital duties or ensure the wife’s economic 
security in case of divorce. Id. at 265 & n.53. Companionate and hybrid societies, however, must 
contend with what Posner identifies as the “complex implications” of the companionate ideal 
“for the rules of divorce.” Id. at 245. Although both companionate and noncompanionate 
societies may seek to discourage or ban divorce on the theory that this will “protect[] the 
[economically dependent] woman against abandonment,” in cultures endorsing the 
companionate ideal, the pressures for a policy allowing divorce are so strong that a policy 
prohibiting divorce becomes untenable. Id. at 247. 
 32. Id. at 183–89; cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (identifying as 
appropriate “attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of [a conse nsual adult 
sexual relationship] . . . or to set its boundaries . . . [in the case of ] injury to a person”). 
According to Posner, “[t]he external effects of sexual activity on children are probably the most 
important to consider.” POSNER, supra  note 16, at 187. 
 33. Posner discusses only two ideals of marriage—companionate and noncompa nionate. 
Based largely on this distinction, this Note identifies three normative models, each consisting of 
a companionate/noncompanionate feature and an economic dependence/independence feature. 
The procreation-only model is noncompanionate, and one spouse is economically dependent on 
the other. The companionship-only model views marriage as a friendship between equals, and 
spouses are generally economically independent of one another. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 
161 (citing Sweden as exhibiting greater “educational and occupational parity between men and 
women . . . than in any other country ”). In the hybrid model discussed in this Note, spouses also 
carry an expectation of mutual friendship, but one spouse is economically dependent on the 
other. 
 34. For Posner, ancient Greek society offers a primary example of a procreation-focused, 
noncompanionate ideal of marriage. Id. at 38–45. Posner’s characterization of the marriages of 
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parts of modern Africa, Asia,35 and the Americas.36 This model takes 
both matriarchal37 and patriarchal38 forms but is most commonly 
characterized by economic inequality between the sexes, relative 
dependence of women on men for economic survival, and 
sequestration39 of women. Spouses in this model do not generally look 
to one another for companionship or friendship.40 Rather, the 
 
ancient Greeks presumably refers chiefly to Athenian culture , in which “[w]omen were 
considered markedly inferior to men in intellect and character” and were subject to the “firmly 
entrenched double standard that enjoined on them but not on men premarital virginity and 
marital fidelity.” Id. at 39. Ancient Greek culture was so overtly “misogynistic” that “[e]ven the 
woman’s role in reproduction was disparaged.” Id. 
 35. For information about modern practices of polygamy in Africa and Asia, see generally 
http://www.polygamyinfo.com. 
 36. In North America, the procreation-only model lies at the heart of the institution of 
plural marriage or polygamy, which, although illegal, is still practiced among a few small groups 
of Latter-day Saints fundamentalists in isolated parts of Utah and Arizona. See generally John 
Dougherty, Special Report, Polygamy in Arizona , NEW TIMES, available at http:// 
www.phoenixnewtimes.com/special_reports/polygamy/; Special Report, Prosecuting Polygamy , 
at http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special45/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2005). Although polygamy 
was practiced by early Mormons, the Mormon Church officially rejected the practice in 1890. In 
most of the United States today, Mormon marriages are monogamous and follow the hybrid 
model in a manner generally indistinguishable from those of non–Mormon Americans. IRWIN 
ALTMAN & JOSEPH GINAT, POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 2–4 (1996).. 
As the fundamentalists interviewed in one study revealed, although the rationales offered to 
justify U.S. fundamentalist polygamy are purely procreative, the larger society’s endorsement of 
the hybrid-companionate model exerts an unavoidable influence on the expectations of 
polygamous family members. These families acknowledge that this tension contributes to the 
considerable stress and anxiety experienced by the adult participants in the plural family, 
especially by female members. Id. at 146–53, 163–72, 437–39. 
 37. See POSNER, supra  note 16, at 259 (alluding to a matriarchal type of procreative-only 
“society in which women did all the work, and men’s only role was . . . inseminat[ion],” and 
suggesting this as one of the only instances of de facto polygamy in which its negative effects 
toward women would be mitigated). 
 38. See, e.g., ALTMAN & GINAT, supra  note 36, at 2–3 (noting the patriarchal origins of 
nineteenth-century polygamy in the United States, characterized by “strict gender roles with 
women assuming . . . domestic and child-rearing responsibilities, and the subordination of 
women to male patriarchal leadership”). 
 39. Sequestration does not refer only to separate living quarters, but to the separate social 
roles of each gender, with women being generally confined to the home, and men being the 
primary actors vis-à-vis the outside world. See also ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 36, at 218 
(“[Latter-day Saints] fundamentalists have long linked women’s roles to the home, leaving men 
to deal with the outside world . . . .”). Posner notes, however, that “sequestration is inconsistent 
with companionability.” POSNER, supra note 16, at 160. Companionability in the ma rriage 
relationship is discussed in Part I.B, infra . 
 40. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 16, at 45 (contrasting the characteristics of companionate 
marriage with “the occasional copulation that was the principal contact between spouses” in 
ancient Greek marriages); ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 36, at 146–53, 163–72, 437–39 (citing 
case studies of contemporary polygamous families and reporting that, despite the best intentions 
of participants, an expectation of romantic love between the husband and each wife appears to 
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purpose of marriage is seen as promoting procreation and ensuring 
the survival of the next generation, who will perpetuate cultural 
practices and social norms.41 
Cultures following the procreative model tend to promote 
gender-based double standards,42 holding women to strict standards 
of chastity43 but allowing men to take additional wives or 
concubines.44 The relationship between spouses in ancient Greece was 
characteristic of procreative cultures in that, “[a]part from the duty of 
economic support, a husband’s legal obligation to his wife was limited 
to having sexual intercourse with her a few times a month.”45 
Concubinage, a feature of many procreative-only societies, is de facto 
polygamy. In addition, in societies in which women’s primary 
economic value is limited to breeding and child-rearing functions, 
procreative-model cultures may officially endorse polygyny46 as a way 
 
be functionally incompatible with a polygamous arrangement, with the result that wives often 
experience emotional insecurity, doubt, and jealously, which in turn places the husband under 
considerable strain). 
 41. For example, Altman and Ginat attest to the procreative emphasis of the normative 
basis for encouraging polygamy among nineteenth-century Mormons and twentieth-century 
fundamentalists, namely, the religious belief “that certain men should ‘multiply and populate 
the earth.’” ALTMAN & GINAT, supra  note 36, at 42 (quoting Genesis 9:7). 
 42. A complaint penned by the great medieval Cordoban philosopher Averoes illustrates 
the extremes of gender inequality and economic dependence that are possible in the 
procreative-only model: 
If male and female natures are the same  . . . , it is obvious that a woman should do the 
same things as a man in that society. . . . However, in our societies, the abilities of 
women are unknown because they are only used for procreation . . . [and] are bound 
to serve their husbands . . . . [T]his renders their other possible activities 
useless. . . .[and they become] a[n economic] burden for men. 
IBN RUSHD AVEROES, EXPOSICIÓN DE LA “REPÚBLICA” DE PLATÓN 57–59 (trans. and ann. by 
Miguel Cruz Hernández, Technos, 1987) (quoted in María Jesús Viguera Molíns, “A Borrowed 
Space: Andalusi and Maghribi Women in Chronicles” in WRITING THE FEMININE: WOMEN IN 
ARAB SOURCES 165, 169–70 (Manuel Marín & Randi Deguilhem eds., 2002)). 
 43. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 40 (stating that the standards of “premarital chastity” 
and “marital fidelity” meant that women in ancient Greece were often “confined to the home 
except for religious and other special occasions”). 
 44. Id. at 40–41. Concubinage is purely an economic exchange of financial support in return 
for sex. Such a relationship is understood to “creat[e] no legal obligations on the part of the man 
toward either the woman or any children born of the union” and is subject to termination at any 
time by eithe r party. Id. at 41. 
 45. Id. at 40. Athenian norms also prevented the husband from “installing another woman 
in [the] house [where his wife lived]. Beyond that he was free to seek sexual pleasure anywhere 
he pleased except with another citizen’s wife or daughter. ” Id. 
 46. Technically, “polygamy ” means “multiple marriages,” and includes arrangements in 
which one man has several wives (“polygyny”) or one woman has several husbands 
(“polyandry ”). BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1180  (7th ed. 1999).  However, because the term 
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to ensure economic support for women and their offspring.47 
Accordingly, if the social purpose of marriage as a civil institution 
rests predominantly on procreative and child-rearing-focused policy 
goals, as opponents of same-sex marriage argue, then the status and 
benefits of marriage may justifiably be denied to members of same-
sex unions. By the same logic, however, the institution may justifiably 
be expanded to include polygamous marriages as a particularly 
efficient means of promoting and achieving the procreative policy 
objective. 
B. The Companionate Model 
Companionate marriages display aspirational qualities such as 
“mutual respect and affection” and “close and continuous association 
in child rearing, household management, and other activities, rather 
than . . . the occasional copulation that [is] the principal contact 
between spouses in the [prototypical procreation-only model].”48 At 
the same time, however, marriage partners must also contend with 
the probability of disappointed expectations of friendship or fidelity. 
These unrealized expectations threaten the longevity of the marital 
relationship,49 contributing to higher divorce rates and lower birth 
rates than in cultures endorsing a procreation-only norm.50 In the 
purely-companionate model,  either marriage partner is equally 
 
“polygamy ” is commonly used as a synonym for “polygyny,” this Note adopts the technically 
incorrect usage as well. 
 47. The rise of Mormon polygamy in the nineteenth century can be traced to the need to 
provide economic security and support for the early Mormon pioneer women whose husbands 
had died. ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 36, at 39. In fundamentalist and non-Western/non-
Mormon polygamous societies alike, the economic burden traditionally carried by the sole male 
participant in the polygynous plural family can be considerable. For this reason, “monogamous 
marriages are more frequent than plural marriages” even in societies that do permit polygamy 
and “plural marriages usually involve older, wealthier, or high-status men.” Id. at 40. 
 48. POSNER, supra  note 16, at 45. 
 49. See id. at 247 (“[A]n ideal of marriages that are based on affection creates pressure for 
the safety valve of divorce when affection between the  spouses fades. . . . [C]ompanionate 
marriage creates so much pressure for divorce as to eventually make a policy of no divorce 
untenable.”). 
 50. Posner points to the Scandinavian countries as an example of the correlation between 
the companionate ideal, on the one hand, and high divorce rates and low birth rates, on the 
other. See id. at 58 (observing that although “[t]he divorce rate is high in the Scandinavian 
countries and the birth rate low, . . . these are phenomena typical of developed countries 
today”). 
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capable of providing economic support for offspring.51 Any inherent 
instability therefore poses little threat to the State’s economic 
interests in ensuring the welfare of offspring.52 When neither the 
children nor the adult partners are economically dependent on the 
continued existence of the marital unit, it becomes unnecessary for a 
society to strictly prohibit “deviant”53 sexual behavior.54 Accordingly, 
purely-companionate societies tend to regulate  “deviant” behavior to 
a minimal extent.55 
The companionate ideal of marriage is a legacy of a 
“preoccupation with individualism” that began to dominate Western 
European thought in the High Middle Ages and culminated in the 
explosive philosophic revolution of nineteenth-century 
Romanticism.56 Marriage as a means of individual fulfillment is 
conceptually rooted in the Romantic movement’s emphasis on heroic 
 
 51. See id. at 195–96 (discussing the effects of changes in women’s employment 
opportunities outside the home). 
 52. See id. at 191 (contrasting the effects of divorce on children in Sweden with those in the 
United States). Posner cites research “attribut[ing] the bad effects of divorce on children to the 
reduced economic and social resources available to the children of divorced parents, [and] 
implying that in a society such as Sweden, in which divorce does not reduce the mother’s income 
substantially, those effects will be small.” Id. at 191 n.19 (citing Verna M. Keith & Barbara 
Finlay, The Impact of Parental Divorce on Children’s Educational Attainment, Marital Timing, 
and Likelihood of Divorce, 50 J. MARRIAGE & THE FAMILY 797, 807 (1988)). 
 53. Posner defines “deviant” sexual behavior as that which is not “procreative-protective,” 
including within this category “masturbation, homosexuality, voyeurism, exhibitionism, 
seduction of young children, and fetishism.” Id. at 98. 
 54. See id. at 174  (suggesting that as “the woman’s role is further enlarged to include 
market employment, then while such marriages as there are will be companionate, there will be 
fewer marriages; [and] other forms of sexual relationship will no longer seem quite so 
abnormal”). As an example of a more lenient regulatory approach, Posner points to the policies 
of the modern Scandinavian cultures, which fall within a predominately companionate model of 
marriage characterized by adherence to the “companionate” ideal and relative economic 
independence of both partners. Id. at 161–73. 
 55. Id. at 162; see also id. at 56 (discussing examples of rising “[s]ocial tolerance for 
noncoercive deviant sexual acts” in twentieth-century Western Europe).  According to Posner, 
ancient Athenian culture also manifested a more lenient regulatory approach to nonmarital 
sexual behavior. Id. at 38–45. For purposes of the discussion in this Note, ancient Athenian 
society is categorized as adhering to a procreation-only model of marriage, which is 
characterized by  economic inequality and rejection of the “companionate” ideal. 
 56. Jacqueline Murray, Individualism and Consensual Marriage: Some Evidence from 
Medieval England, in WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY IN MEDIEVAL CHRISTENDOM 121, 
126 (Rousseau et al. eds., 1998); see also William Eskridge, A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 
VA. L. REV. 1419, 1436 (1993) (“Companionate unions are most similar to those that are 
typically valorized by most modern Western perspectives.”). 
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individualism.57 Under this ideal, State institutionalization of marriage 
serves as a socially stabilizing influence58 by recognizing and affirming 
the spouses’ commitment to one another. According to the German 
Romantic philosopher Georg W. F. Hegel,59 whereas procreation is 
“[n]either essential to marriage [n]or its chief end,” the individual’s 
interest in self-fulfillment60 through companionship is pivotal to 
properly understanding the role that marriage plays in the modern 
state.61 The primary social function of marriage62 is “its capacity to 
 
 57. See generally Joseph Campbell, THE HERO WITH A THOUSAND FACES (2d ed. 1972). 
The modern understanding of the heroic archetype reinterprets the hero’s quest as the pursuit 
of individually oriented—not communitarian—goals, such as the individual’s private struggle for 
self-definition. The work of the German Romantic composer Richard Wagner represents an 
extreme example of the Romantic obsession with the individual’s Heroic Quest for identity and 
self-actualization. 
 58. As discussed at supra note 49, instability is an inherent weakness of both companionate 
models of marriage. 
 59. See Maura Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Poly gamy and 
Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1523–32 (1997) (delineating the Hegelian perspective 
on the role of marriage in the modern state) (citing GEORG W. F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF 
RIGHT ¶ 164, at 113. (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1821). 
 60. Self-fulfillment arguments take many forms and are often invoked by proponents of 
same-sex marriage. For example, one commentator has summarized the core of the cultural 
debate about the normative purpose of marriage by recognizing that, although “[c]hildren are 
not a trivial reason for marriage, they . . . cannot be the only reason.” Jonathan Rauch, For 
Better or Worse? The Case for Gay (and Straight) Marriage, NEW REPUBLIC, May 6, 1996, at 18, 
22. Aside from this procreative objective, however, two additional purposes of heterosexual 
marriage “give society a compelling interest” in expanding the definition of marriage to include 
same-sex couples. Id. at 23. These additional purposes—“domesticating men” and “[mutual] 
caregiv[ing]”—are clearly companionate notions, with the former, especially, being oriented 
toward (male) self-actualization. Id. at 22. Rauch argues that because “[m]arriage is the only 
institution that . . . serves these purposes,” the fact that privileging same-sex unions would serve 
even “[t]wo out of three” of these purposes “is more than enough to give society a compelling 
interest” in legitimizing same-sex unions. Id. at 23. See generally Eskridge, supra note 56. 
 61. Strassberg, supra note 59, at 1531 (citing Hegel, supra note 59, ¶ 164, at 113). Strassberg 
notes the similarity between Hegel’s view of marriage and that expressed in Turner v. Safley , 
482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987). The Turner Court “recognized that the incarceration of one of the 
partners [in a marriage] eliminated the  . . . procreative facets of marriage without destroying 
what Hegel would describe as marriage’s ‘ethical character.’” This “ethical character” embodies 
“important attributes of marriage. . . . [such as] emotional support and [expression of] public 
commitment.” Strassberg, supra  note 59, at 1559. 
 62. The other purpose of marriage in Hegel’s view of society is also individual in nature, 
emphasizing the “capacity [of marriage] to produce individuals who are self-conscious moral 
agents.” Strassberg, supra note 59, at 1557. Compare Hegel, supra note 59, ¶ 167, at 115 
(“Marriage, and especially monogamy, is one of the absolute principles on which the ethical life 
of a community depends. Hence ma rriage comes to be recorded as one of the moments in the 
founding of states by gods or heroes.”) and id., ¶ 264, at 163 (“in the family and civil society 
they . . . find their substantive self-consciousness in social institutions”) with Goodridge v. Dept. 
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) (“[C]ivil marriage enhances the ‘welfare of the 
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provide . . . otherwise isolated individuals with a sense that they can 
be unified with others in a way that preserves their individuality.”63 
Romantic love is the mechanism for achieving this function.64 Hegel’s 
understanding of the function of sexual behavior in society is thus 
consistent with a purely -companionate model of marriage. If 
sensuality and any sexual behavior flowing from it are mere forms of 
self-expression,65 a relationship characterized by romantic love will 
enable individual participants to achieve further self-fulfillment 
through self-expression. 
In contrast to the procreative model, therefore, sexual behavior 
in a companionate model of marriage has a social significance entirely 
unrelated to a procreative objective. Similarly, whereas an emotional 
relationship between partners is irrelevant in the procreative model,66 
the impetus for companionate marriage is the partners’ emotional 
and psychological attraction to one another.67 This emotional 
component is also largely responsible for the inherent instability of 
relationships characterized by romantic love,68 thereby creating the 
need for a stabilizing counterforce such as the civil institution of 
marriage.69 Thus, in a purely-companionate model, marriage serves 
not only as an impetus for further self-individuation, but also as a 
socially unifying force, “break[ing] down barriers between individuals 
and creat[ing] bonds of partnership and communal purpose.”70 The 
normative stability that marriage fosters through legal and social 
recognition of partners’ commitment to one another counterbalances 
the inherent instability of relationships based on romantic love. 
 
community’. . . . [and] is a ‘social institution of the highest importance.’ Civil marriage . . . 
encourage[s] stable relationships over transient ones.” (citation omitted)). 
 63. Strassberg, supra note 59, at 1557. 
 64. Id. at 1607. Acknowledging the sexism in Hegel’s work, Strassberg speculates that 
“Hegel likely was ambivalent about romantic love as a basis of marriage because he recognized 
that romantic love would necessarily individuate women to such an extent that the sacrifice of 
women to male individuality would then result in a sacrifice of male individuality as well.” Id. 
Strassberg’s speculation is based in part on Hegel’s argument that “an arranged marriage is 
ethically superior to a marriage motivated by love.” Id. at 1607 n.593. 
 65. See id. at 1609 n.603 (noting  that the purpose of modern relationships is “mutual 
discovery” and emotional “self-disclosure” (quoting ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF MODERNITY 119–22 (1990))). 
 66. See generally supra Part I.A. 
 67. See generally supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
 68. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 69. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text (referring to high divorce rates in 
cultures that subscribe to the two models of marriage characterized by a companionate feature).  
 70. Strassberg, supra note 59, at 1610. 
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Marriage’s role as a normatively stabilizing counterforce offers a 
logical basis for distinguishing between dyadic partnerships and 
polygamous arrangements and demonstrating that a normative model 
of marriage can include same-sex couples while excluding 
polygamous arrangements.71 The exclusion of polygamy is a necessary 
result of the individualist values of the companionate ideal and of two 
important differences between the procreative and companionate 
models. First, in contrast to the more elastic procreative model, 
marriages in the companionate model can only accommodate two 
partners. Second, because companionate-model spouses are 
economically independent of each other, the offspring’s economic 
well-being72 does not depend on continued existence of the marital 
unit. If there is no procreative ideal for marriage to protect, the 
importance of regulating nonprocreative sexual behavior fades.73 
Requiring that both genders be represented within the marital unit is 
one example of a procreatively focused policy that loses its purpose 
when the procreation-protective rationale is removed. In the absence 
of that rationale, the only normative requirements for marriage 
become equality74 and the existence of an emotional bond, such as 
romantic love,75 between the partners.76 By contrast, the procreative 
 
 71. Posner points to a pattern of “polygamy, de jure or de facto, in a society of 
noncompanionate marriage; [and] monogamy in a society of companionate marriage.” POSNER, 
supra note 16, at 259. It is worth noting, however, that in light of the high rate of divorce in 
companionate-model societies, monogamy in this model may actually be serial monogamy 
instead of the traditional notion of a partne rship for life. 
 72. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Because the offspring’s economic well-being 
is crucial to furthering society’s interest in continued self-preservation, it plays a pivotal role in 
the overarching economic goal of maximizing the welfare of the community as a whole. 
 73. See infra Part I.C (linking heavy regulation of nonprocreative sexual behavior in the 
hybrid model to the  offspring’s economic dependency on the marital unit remaining intact); see 
also supra note 49 (discussing the regulation of divorce). 
 74. For purposes of this discussion, “equality” includes the notion of economic 
independence of each participant. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 45 (defining “companionate 
marriage” as a marriage between approximate equals).  
 75. When marriage becomes a companionate arrangement as opposed to a procreative/ 
economic arrangement, the emotional bond between partners functions as a precursor to 
mutuality and consent. See Murray, supra note 56, at 126 (discussing the connection between 
early notions of consent and the modern notion that “freedom to marry . . . is one of the tests by 
which to measure a society’s respect for individual freedom of choice in general.” (citing John F. 
Benton, Individualism and Conformity in Medieval Western Europe, in INDIVIDUALISM AND 
CONFORMITY IN CLASSICAL ISLAM 145, 155–56 (Amin Banai and Speros Vryonis eds., 1977))). 
 76. Any attempt to qualitatively distinguish the emotional relationships enjoyed by same -
sex couples from those of heterosexual couples would be hopelessly subje ctive. Persons of either 
orientation would be incapable of temporarily altering their own sexual orientation enough to 
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ideal requires that both genders be represented within each marital 
unit, but the partners need not experience an emotional bond to fulfill 
the purpose of marriage.77 
Just as any male -female relationship is by definition capable of 
furthering a procreative purpose, any dyadic relationship 
characterized by self-expressive sensuality and a companionate bond 
is capable  of furthering self-individuation. If a heterosexual dyadic 
relationship—whether procreative or nonprocreative—fulfills this 
function, then so would a nonprocreative, dyadic same-sex 
relationship. Conversely, just as the procreative model is inherently 
stable, regardless of the number of participants in the marital unit,78 
the companionate model’s inherent instability does not depend on the 
participants’ gender. Finally, whereas polygamous relationships are 
easily accommodated within the purely -procreative model,79 in the 
purely-companionate model, polygamy is necessarily excluded due to 
the individualist expectations on which companionate relationships 
are based. The practice of polygamy is fundamentally incompatible 
with the companionate model of marriage80 because it negates the 
values and objectives of individualism and self-fulfillment that this 
model seeks to promote.81 
 
meaningfully compare the two emotional experiences of romantic love. In either type of 
relationship, the word of the respective couples themselves would be the only proof that any 
particular type of mutual emotional bond exists. 
 77. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text (discussing the irrelevance of emotional 
ties between partners in the procreative model and noting the stress caused in procreation-only 
encla ves by the influence of companionate expectations from the dominant culture outside the 
enclave). 
 78. This is true as long as its members do not also expect the marital relationship to be the 
source of individual fulfillment. See ALTMAN & GINAT, supra  note 36, at 146–53, 163–72, 437–39 
(reporting the elusiveness of actual companionate relationships between the husband and each 
wife in polygynous American families and the resulting stress to the family as a whole ). 
 79. As this Note argues in Part I.A, supra , under a purely-procreative, non-companionate 
model of marriage, it is irrational to include dyadic same-sex partnerships—which are only 
tenuously related to procreation—in the definition of marriage while refusing to sanction 
polygamous arrangements, because the latter are more efficient than dyadic heterosexual 
partnerships at fulfilling procreative policy objectives.  
 80. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 6, 259 (stating that de jure or de facto polygamy will be 
found in those societies that promote a noncompanionate ideal of marriage, whereas monogamy 
will be found in societies with companionate marriage); see also id. at 253–60 (exploring the 
practice of polygamy from an economic perspe ctive). With respect to the three-model 
framework of this Note’s analysis, therefore, polygamy is incompatible with both the hybrid and 
the companionship-only models, because these both adhere to a companionate ideal of 
marriage. See infra Part II.C (discussing the hybrid model of marriage). 
 81. Early American proponents of polygamy viewed it as an antidote to the rising tide of 
social liberalism emphasizing “greater freedom of choice of marital partners, women’s rights, 
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C. The Hybrid Model 
Procreation-plus-companionship is the model that many Western 
cultures purport to follow.82 The remainder of this Note refers to this 
model as the “hybrid model” because it combines the normative ideal 
of marriage as a procreation-oriented economic arrangement83 with 
the companionate expectation that partners will foster and maintain a 
friendship of “approximate equals.”84 Like a purely-companionate 
model, this hybrid model only accommodates two people.85 
The hybrid model retains some features of the purely-procreative 
model but rejects primarily communitarian values in favor of 
individualist notions ranging from consent to self-actualization. In this 
regard, it resembles the purely -companionate model.86 As early as 
 
easier divorces, . . . and . . . [generally enhanced] individual rights. ” ALTMAN & GINAT, supra 
note 36, at 2. The mutual exclusivity of poly gamy and the companionate ideal flows from the 
necessarily dyadic contours of the companionate relationship. See id. at 146–53, 164–72, 437–39 
(noting that, in Mormon fundamentalist polygamous families, despite attempts to ensure equal 
treatment of each dyadic relationship (i.e., the two-party relationship between the husband and 
each wife), actual companionate relationships prove elusive). 
 82. The hybrid model is somewhat similar to what Posner labels “stage two” in his 
chronicle of the “evolution of sexual morality” in that it has historically included Western 
nations from medieval times through the twentieth century. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 45–
54. Posner identifies England as a “pioneer” in this model of marriage and points to the 
medieval Roman Catholic Church as nominally encouraging at least the normative concept, if 
not its actual practice. See id. at 156–57 (“England was the pioneer in companionate marriage, 
although it did not invent the practice. . . . [which also] received the encouragement of the 
Church.”). 
 83. See id. at 250 (describing the “extreme economic peril” of the divorced woman “in a 
society in which women’s principal asset is their fertility”). 
 84. Id. at 45. 
 85. As discussed in Part I.B, supra, polygamy is incompatible with the individualist values 
of the companionate ideal. 
 86. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 157 (attributing the origins of the notions of 
companionship and mutuality in marriage to the Bible and the Greco-Roman tradition, but 
noting that the importance of these ideals increased during the Enlightenment). Ultimately, 
these seminal notions blossom into the full-blown concept of individual self-actualization 
promoted by the Romantic philosophers. For discussion of Hegel’s version of this concept, see 
supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. See also Murray, supra note 56, at 124–26 (tracing the 
medieval development of the notion of consent as essential to forming the marital bond).  As 
Murray further points out, because “[t]he freedom to marry is part of the process by which the 
individual gains independence from external control,” the rise of the “consensual theory of 
marriage . . . reflect[s] the preoccupation with individualism that [begins to] dominate [Western 
European thought in] the twelfth[] century” and later becomes a seminal impetus for the 
modern notion of “individual freedom of choice in general.” Id. at 126–27. Consensual marriage 
has become so enshrined as a norm in modern U.S. society that the Supreme Court has declared 
freedom to marry a fundamental constitutional right. 
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Loving v. Virginia,87 the Supreme Court recognized the dual function 
of marriage in U.S. culture.88 On one hand, the Court called marriage 
“fundamental to [American society’s] very existence and survival,” 
clearly referring to the traditional procreative purpose.89 On the other 
hand, it identified “the freedom to marry . . . [as] one of the vital 
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness,” 
referring  to the companionate ideal of marriage as a means of 
achieving individual fulfillment.90 
However, the hybrid model’s economic function permits it to be 
readily distinguished from the companionate model. Although this 
difference may be somewhat obscured by the companionate aspect of 
the hybrid model, the latter’s normative purpose as a procreation-
oriented, economic arrangement becomes unmistakable in the 
context of divorce. In societies endorsing the hybrid model, the 
unstable nature of companionate marriage91 directly threatens the 
 
 87. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 88.  Posner suggests that the United States has traditionally adhered to a normative model 
of marriage characterized by endorsement of the “companionate” ideal. POSNER, supra note 16, 
at 157 (“[T]he culture that most celebrates companionate marriage, in succession to England, is 
the United States. ”). However, the United States places far greater emphasis on traditional 
sexual morality than other developed countries that endorse companionate marriage. This 
greater emphasis is evidenced by the fact that “the United States criminalizes more sexual 
conduct than other developed countries do and punishes the sexual conduct that it criminalizes 
in common with those countries more severely, relative to the punishment of nonsex crimes.” 
Id. at 78. After contrasting Swedish sexual regulatory policy with that of the United States, 
Posner concludes that this “traditional sexual morality is founded on women’s dependence upon 
men.” Id. at 180. Women in such situations “need[] the protection of men in order to have 
children[,] and when careers not inv olving children [a]re closed to them.” Id. Accordingly, in 
light of the fact that economic equality has not historically been a feature of marital 
relationships in the United States, the emphasis on traditional morality indicates that the United 
States adheres to the hybrid model of normative marriage rather than a purely -companionate 
model. As American women’s wage-earning capacity gains parity with that of men, Posner’s 
theory would predict that U.S. culture will undergo a corresponding shift from the hybrid model 
toward a purely-companionate norm. As he says: 
[A]s [women’s] dependence [upon men] lessens, the traditional morality weakens. 
The function of that morality is to protect the male’s interest in warranted confidence 
that his children really are his biolog ical issue. Women will cooperate in securing that 
interest only if they are compensated for doing so. . . . [but] [w]omen need and receive 
less male protection as their childbearing role diminishes and their market 
opportunities grow.” 
Id. 
 89. Id. at 12. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. Although this instability is an inherent 
feature of both models featuring a companionate ideal, it only poses such a socially significant 
threat in the hybrid model. 
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offspring’s economic well-being,92 thereby undermining the state’s 
interest in self-preservation. Similarly, while uncertain paternity 
would pose little threat to offspring in purely-companionate societies, 
in which spouses are typically both market participants and therefore 
economically independent,93 “considerations of secure paternity” 
remain an important policy focus in hybrid cultures.94 This difference 
between the hybrid and the purely -companionate models accounts for 
their contrasting regulatory approaches to policing sexual behavior. 
Whereas the purely-companionate model takes a permissive 
approach to regulating extra- and non-arital sexual behaviors, the 
hybrid model regulates these heavily.95 Hybrid-model societies 
sanction sexual behavior according to narrow parameters and strictly 
prohibit “deviant” behaviors,96 including prostitution, adultery, 
fornication, and bigamy. Underlying these prohibitions is a policy of 
insulating the marital unit from destabilizing influences.97 
Accordingly, the current uproar over proposed change to the legal 
definition of marriage can be analyzed as resulting, at least in part, 
from the heavily regulatory approach the United States has 
historically implemented to shore up its hybrid model of marriage. 
Analyzing the arguments for and against redefining marriage in 
light of these three models reveals that the polygamy argument is an 
 
 92. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.  
 93. Id. at 174 & n.72. Posner points to statistics showing that “[a]lmost three-fourths of 
Swedish women are employed outside the home, compared to fewer than 60 percent of 
American women.” Id. at 174. Further, women in Sweden are paid “90 percent of the average 
male wage, a third higher than in the United States.” Id. These statistics further confirm that the 
United States is a hybrid model culture , whereas Sweden falls closer to the purely -
companionate model. 
 94. See id. at 173–74 (“If the woman’s . . . role is . . . that of child rearer and husband’s 
companion, as well as breeder, . . . . considerations of secure paternity are foremost.”); see also 
id. at 95 (“If a father’s support . . . [is] vital to the survival of his children to reproductive age, a 
man will have a powerful incentive to . . . watch [his wives] like a hawk to make sure they are 
bearing his children, lest he waste costly protective efforts perpetuating another man’s genes. ”). 
The importance of secure paternity is a direct consequence of economic inequality between 
spouses. If women are economically dependent on men, the child of uncertain paternity will 
have no guarantee of economic support; therefore, the child will either fail to thrive 
(threatening the culture ’s interest in self-preservation) or become an economic burden to the 
State. 
 95. See, e.g., id. at 72, 161–67 (describing aspects of Scandinavian regulatory policies of 
sexual behavior that starkly contrast with those of the United States).  
 96. Id. at 158. 
 97. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 158 (“A husband’s adultery becomes . . . offensive, 
because it undermines love and trust and reduces the amount of time that he spends with his 
wife, which are elements of companionate but not of noncompanionate marriage.”). 
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unhelpful diversion in the same-sex marriage debate, a byproduct of 
the tension and confusion generated by the hybrid model of marriage 
American culture has historically endorsed. In keeping with this 
model, the normative conception of the purpose of marriage in 
American society has been characterized by competing factors: on the 
one hand, the historic fact of economic inequality between 
(predominantly heterosexual) spouses along with a traditional focus 
on procreation and economic stability, and, on the other hand, a 
growing emphasis on companionship and individual fulfillment.98 As 
Sections A and B point out, in societies that do not promote such 
competing objectives, nonprocreative or nonmarital sexual behaviors 
pose little threat to the State’s interest in the economic well-being of 
the child. Accordingly, in such cultures, the State has less incentive to 
regulate individual sexual behavior. By contrast, in a hybrid culture, 
the State maintains an important economic interest in policing sexual 
behavior.99 This is due to the hybrid model’s unique structure, which 
combines the instability that inheres in the companionate ideal100 with 
the relative inequality between spouses that causes offspring to be 
economically dependent on the continued existence of the marital 
unit.101 
The competing features of the normative American ideal, in 
which marriage has both procreative/economic and companionate 
purposes, provide each side of the same-sex marriage debate with a 
valid premise on which to base its position. Opponents of same-sex 
marriage assert the procreative/economic feature in support of their 
argument,102 whereas proponents focus almost exclusively on the 
 
 98. See supra Part I.B (exploring the origins and ideals of the companionate notion of 
marriage).  
 99. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 100. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. The high divorce rate in societies that 
promote the companionate ideal attests to the inherent instability of models characterized by 
this feature. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 247. The ironic disconnect between this fact and the 
companionate ideal’s normative assumption of “a mutual understanding of lasting commitment” 
between partners is worth noting. William Eskridge, Beyond Lesbian and Gay Families We 
Choose, in SEX, PREFERENCE AND FAMILY: ESSAYS ON LAW AND NATURE 277, 286 (David M. 
Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1996).  
 101. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 102. See, e.g., supra note 9; see also Defense of Marriage Act: Hearings on H.R. 3396 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong . 97–102 (1996) 
(statement of Hadley Arkes, professor of jurisprudence and American institutions, Amherst 
College, suggesting that extending the definition of marriage to include same -sex unions would 
“set[] off many other kinds of changes . . . . [as a result of which society would inevitably] move 
away from the sense that there is something portentous about the generation of new life”); 
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companionate and individual fulfillment aspects of the cultural 
norm.103 Each argument, although entirely logical as a deduction from 
its starting premise, fails to recognize the hybrid nature of the model 
of marriage American culture has historically endorsed. 
Consequently, these conflicting, selective views of the normative 
purpose of hybrid-model marriage inevitably generate disagreement 
about whether the definition of marriage can be expanded without 
destroying the purpose of the institution. Part II will explore whether 
recent case law provides any guidance in resolving this issue. 
II.  RECENT TRENDS IN LEGAL REASONING  
REFLECT MODIFICATION OF THE HYBRID MODEL 
Although the answer to the polygamy issue is clear in either the 
purely-procreative or purely -companionate models, American 
society’s understanding of the function of marriage has historically 
emphasized both procreative economics and romantic 
companionship, while featuring the weaknesses of both other models. 
These competing factors have given rise to the debate over whether 
expanding the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples 
could also lead to the legalization of polygamy. 
However, two recent cases indicate that despite having long 
defined marriage in terms of the hybrid model, American culture is 
currently undergoing a normative shift in its understanding of the 
purpose of marriage as a civil institution. While the procreative and 
economic functions are diminishing, greater emphasis is being placed 
on the companionate ideal as a means of achieving further 
individuation and self-fulfillment. In effect, American society’s 
historically hybrid model of marriage is being transformed into a 
predominantly companionate model. 
This Part explores two cases that recognized this broad-based 
cultural shift. In Lawrence v. Texas,104 the Supreme Court invoked 
companionate values, especially individual interest, to overturn a 
state law criminalizing private, noncommercial, consensual sexual 
activity between same-sex couples. In Goodridge v. Department of 
 
Jonathan Rauch, Marrying Somebody , in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, 285, 287 
(Andrew Sullivan ed., rev. ed. 2004) (asserting that the “committed, stable relationships” 
resulting from marriage “provide the best environment for raising children”). 
 103. For examples of such an argument, see supra note 60. 
 104. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
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Public Health,105 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 
recognizing that the Lawrence opinion had chosen to steer clear of 
the issue altogether, considered the state constitutionality, under 
Massachusetts law, of extending the civil institution of marriage to 
include same-sex unions. The holding in Goodridge, as in Lawrence, 
hinged on a view of the purpose and nature of marriage entirely 
consistent with the companionate model. However, Goodridge 
extended the princ iples announced in Lawrence, rejecting the hybrid 
model’s dual-purpose view of civil marriage and fully adopting the 
companionate model. Together, these two cases signal a growing 
recognition of the current cultural trend away from the hybrid model 
and toward the companionate model. 
A. Lawrence v. Texas 
Lawrence is the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on 
the relative importance of the individual’s interest in autonomy 
compared to the procreative interest. In Lawrence, the Court 
revisited the constitutionality of state antisodomy laws, overruling 
Bowers v. Hardwick106 and upholding the right of same-sex adults to 
engage in consensual sexual activity.107 
The Lawrence opinion noted that antisodomy laws did not 
originally discriminate on the basis of gender but were directed at 
nonprocreative sexual behavior in general.108 This observation 
implied recognition of the tension between the procreative and 
companionate ideals in the American culture’s hybrid model, in 
which the State traditionally had a significant regulatory interest109 in 
discouraging both nonmarital and nonprocreative sexual conduct.110 
 
 105. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 106. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
 107. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see id. at 571–72 (“[O]ur laws and traditions in the past half 
century . . . . show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult 
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”). In dicta, 
the Lawrence Court chided the Bowers Court, suggesting that “[t]his emerging recognition 
should have been apparent when Bowers was decided.” Id. at 572. 
 108. See id. at 568 (“[E]arly American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as 
such but . . . sought to prohibit non-procreative sexual activity more gene rally.”). 
 109. As discussed in Part I.C, supra , the regulatory interest arose because of the State’s need 
to ensure the economic well-being of both partners and any offspring (which the State 
encouraged) in light of the inherent instability of the “companionate” side of the hybrid model. 
 110. Cf. Strassberg, supra  note 59, at 1608–09 (attributing “the explosion of Roma ntic 
literature, music, and art” in nineteenth-century Europe to the self-expressive quality of these 
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However, as the dissent in Lawrence noted, if one assumes a 
viewpoint of moral indifference,111 not even a policy of encouraging 
procreation justifies drawing the boundaries of the institution of 
marriage so narrowly as to exclude same-sex couples.112 
In crafting its analysis, the Lawrence Court chose not to 
invalidate the statute on equal protection grounds.113 Instead, the 
Court aligned its holding with other cases valuing individual 
autonomy as “a form of ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process 
Clause.”114 Justice Kennedy began by invoking the broader political 
role that the  individual interest plays in preserving the ideals of 
democracy, reasoning that “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self 
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression.”115 As if 
underscoring the normative weight due the individual interest in 
these matters, the Court cited examples of other common law 
countries that had recently reaffirmed individual autonomy as an 
important norm.116 By going outside its own jurisprudence to support 
 
personal experiences, and suggesting that this Romantic artistic “explosion . . . can [also] be 
seen as expression in the service of radical individuation”). 
 111. The majority expressly assumed such a viewpoint. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 559 
(“[F]or centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral, 
but this Court’s obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate its own moral code.”). 
 112. See id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[Apart from moral concerns,] what justification 
could there possibly be  for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising 
‘the liberty protected by the Constitution’? Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since 
the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.” (quoting id. at 567) (citations omitted)). 
Although the Lawrence dissent protested that “[s]tates continue to prosecute all sorts of crime 
by adults ‘in matters pertaining to sex’ [including] prostitution, adult incest, adultery, obscenity, 
and child pornography[,]” the legitimate State interest in such prosecutions, from a viewpoint of 
moral indifference, would be the socially undesirable externalities and third-party effects of 
such conduct. Id. at 598. 
 113. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (majority opinion) (“Were we to hold the statute invalid 
under . . . [e]qual [p]rotection[,] some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if 
drawn differently  . . . to prohibit the conduct both between same -sex and different-sex 
participants.”). 
 114. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting), quoted in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
Lawrence further reasoned that because “[e]quality of treatment and the due process right . . . 
are linked in important respects, . . . a decision on the latter point advances both interests.” 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
 115. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
 116. See id. at 576 (“Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of 
the protected right of . . . homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct . . . . [and 
have accepted] the right petitioners seek in this case  . . . as an integral part of human 
freedom . . . .”). The Court pointed to decisions by the European Court of Human Rights as 
support for this assertion. Id. (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981); 
Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988)). 
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its rationale, the Court emphasized both the appropriateness and 
importance of extending the ideal of individual liberty in matters of 
personal choice to its fullest degree.117 
Lawrence also acknowledged that the holding and rationale of 
Bowers were directly contrary to other substantive due process 
cases.118 This contradiction is not surprising in light of the confusion 
generated by the American culture’s hybrid ideal, which has 
historically emphasized both procreative and companionate values. In 
dicta, however, the Court suggested that the companionate aspect of 
the hybrid ideal may be gaining strength in American society as a 
whole. Lawrence pointed to “an emerging awareness that liberty gives 
substantial protection to adult[s]. . . in deciding how to conduct their 
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”119 The Court explicitly 
identified this “emerging awareness” with the values promoted by a 
companionate model.120 These observations implicitly recognized two 
cultural phenomena: first, the competing normative ideals in 
American culture; and second, an ongoing reevaluation process. In 
the course of this reevaluation, the Court suggested, the normative 
focus in regulating sexual behavior has been shifting away from 
safeguarding procreative economics and toward enshrining the 
individual interest.121 Accordingly, because the notion of marriage as 
a means of furthering individual fulfillment comports as readily with 
same-sex marriage as it does with heterosexual marriage, expanding 
civil marriage to include same-sex couples would be consistent with 
this increasing emphasis on companionate-model values. At the same 
time, however, expanding the definition of marriage to include same-
 
 117. Cf. Donald E. Childress III, Note, Using Comparative Constitutional Law to Resolve 
Domestic Federal Questions, 53 DUKE L.J. 193, 203–06 (2003) (discussing the current legal 
debate on the appropriateness of using comparative law in constitutional interpretation, and 
noting that several federal appellate judges and Supreme Court justices support the use of 
comparative law by American courts “to aid in their own deliberative process” (citing William 
Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts—Comparative Remarks, Address in Commemoration of the 
Fortieth Anniversary of the German Basic Law (1989), in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412  (Paul Kirchoff & 
Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993))). 
 118. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (“Bowers itself causes uncertainty, for the precedents 
before and after its issuance contradict its central holding.”). 
 119. Id. at 572. 
 120. See id. at 567 (“When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another 
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring .”). 
 121. Although Lawrence focuses on the due process right to personal autonomy in private 
matters, individual interest is the logical premise underlying this right. 
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sex couples would be unlikely to lead to legalization of polygamy 
because polygamy is based on values that are antithetical to the 
companionate ideals driving the reevaluation process. 
B. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 
Beyond merely endorsing companionate values, as Lawrence 
had, Goodridge expressly rejected the hybrid model’s juxtaposition of 
a procreative-protective purpose for marriage alongside its 
companionate aspect. Instead, the  Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts based its approach on an entirely companionate 
purpose. The issue in Goodridge was whether Massachusetts could 
continue to exclude same-sex couples from “the protections, benefits, 
and obligations conferred by civil marriage.”122 After a lengthy 
analysis, the court concluded that such an exclusion was inconsistent 
with the Massachusetts Constitution.123 More importantly, 
Massachusetts had “failed to identify any constitutionally adequate 
reason for denying civil marriage to same-sex couples.”124 
The majority’s analysis in Goodridge relied in large part on 
Lawrence to resolve an issue that Lawrence had not explicitly 
addressed: whether there was a legitimate state purpose for excluding 
same-sex couples from marriage.125 The court began by identifying the 
companionate purpose of marriage in modern society: “[w]hile it 
is . . . true that many . . . married couples have children together . . . , 
it is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage 
partners to one another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine 
qua non of civil marriage.”126 Having resolved the hybrid problem by 
subordinating the traditional procreative interest to the 
 
 122. 798 N.E.2d at 948. 
 123. See id. (“The Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all 
individuals. It forbids the creation of second-class citizens. ”). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 953. By framing the question this way, even while recognizing that the long -
established definition of marriage exclusively denoted one type of dyadic, heterosexual 
partnership, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court engaged in the same reevaluation 
process indirectly condoned in Lawrence, in which the majority and the dissent agreed that 
“later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to 
oppress.” Lawrence, 539 U. S. at 579; id. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 126. Goodridge,  798 N.E.2d at 961; see id. at 954 (“Civil marriage is at once a deeply 
personal commitment to another human being and a . . . celebration of the ideals of mutuality, 
companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family.”); id. at 968 (“[T]he basic premises of individual 
liberty and equality under law [are] protected by the Massachusetts Constitution.”). 
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companionate ideal,127 the court made the logical move of rejecting 
the procreative rationale advanced by Massachusetts, holding this 
rationale an unsatisfactory basis for refusing to define marriage to 
include same-sex couples.128 By framing the issue in terms of 
redefinition, Goodridge affirmed the role of marriage in society129 but 
more closely aligned it with “evolving constitutional standards.”130 
 
 127. The Dutch legislature took a similar approach to resolving the conflict between 
procreative and companionate values that has plagued hybrid-model cultures: it  passed an 
enactment that expanded civil marriage to include same -sex couples. See “Wet openstelling 
huwelijk” (Stb. 2001, nr 9 (11 januari 2001) amending Book 1 of the Civil Code, becoming law 
on April 1, 2001), www.eerstekamer.nl/9324000/1/j9vvgh5ihkk7kof/vfsgbl20fnzb/f=x.pdf (Kees 
Waaldijk’s unofficial English translation is available at http://athena.leidenuniv.nl/rechten/ 
meijers/index.php3?c=86). Like the rationales used in Goodridge, Lawrence, and Halpern v. 
Toronto, [2003] 172 O.A.C. 276, the rationale of the Dutch legislature focused almost 
exclusively on the individual interest in companionship and self-fulfillment. By further 
extending full adoption rights to same-sex couples, the legislature demonstrated that the 
procreative aspect of hybrid marriage could be served in a companionate model. 
Exploring how this dramatic conceptual shift gathered such momentum in the Western 
world is beyond the scope of this Note, although increases in women’s social and economic 
equality likely have played a significant role by making women less dependent on marriage for 
economic security, and therefore more accepting of the individuation-oriented companionate 
aspect of marriage. As explained in Part I.B, supra, once this individuation/companionate 
purpose of marriage is fully embraced, the biological differences between men and women that 
play such an important role in the traditional procreative purpose lose their significance almost 
entirely, except as a means of distinguishing one individual’s personal sexual preference from 
that of another. 
 128. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968 (citing “[t]he absence of any reasonable relationship 
between, on the one hand, an absolute disqualification of same-sex couples who wish to enter 
into civil marriage and, on the other, protection of public health, safety, or general welfare”). 
Although the Goodridge court acknowledged that limiting marriage to heterosexual couples 
conceivably served a permissible state purpose in the past, it insisted that this was no longer the 
case. See id. at 961 n.23: 
It is hardly surprising that civil marriage developed historically as a means to regulate 
heterosexual conduct and to promote child rearing, because until very recently 
unassisted heterosexual relations were the only means short of adoption by which 
children could come into the world, and the absence of widely available and effective 
contraceptives made the link between heterosexual sex and procreation very strong 
indeed. But it is circular reasoning, not analysis, to maintain that marriage must 
remain a heterosexual institution because that is what it historically has been. As one 
dissent acknowledges, in ‘the modern age,’ ‘heterosexual intercourse, procreation, 
and child care are not necessarily conjoined.’ 
(quoting id. at 995–96 (Cordy, J., dissenting)). 
 129. See id. at 964 (“Excluding same -sex couples from civil marriage will not make children 
of opposite-sex marriages more secure, but it does prevent children of same -sex couples from 
enjoying the immeasurable advantages that flow from the assurance of ‘a stable family structure 
in which children will be reared, educated, and socialized.’” (quoting id. at 995 (Cordy, J., 
dissenting))). 
 130. Id. at 969. 
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Having justified its decision, the Goodridge court next searched 
for a foundation on which to build its new definition. Here, 
Goodridge followed the example of Lawrence in seeking guidance 
outside its own jurisprudence.131 The Massachusetts court reasoned 
that “this remedy . . . is entirely consonant with established principles 
of jurisprudence empowering a court to refine a common-law 
principle in light of evolving constitutional standards.”132 Although 
the court had rejected the procreative interest when considering 
whether to redefine marriage,133 the Goodridge court now chose one 
aspect of that interest to help determine the contours of the modified 
definition: third-party effects on children.134 By accepting these third-
party effects as a rational basis for state regulation of marriage and as 
an incentive to include same-sex partnerships within the newly 
expanded definition of marriage, the court demonstrated that the 
controversy generated by the hybrid model could be resolved by 
subordinating the procreative aspect to the companionate aspect.135 
Accordingly, the Goodridge rationale provides a useful 
foundation for addressing the issue of polygamy. On its face, 
Goodridge might appear to confirm the notion that extending the 
benefits and protections of marriage to same-sex unions also justifies 
 
 131. The case cited by both courts, Halpern v. Toronto, [2003] 172 O.A.C. 276, justified 
expanding the definition of marriage by analogizing  to the evolution of banking practices 
beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. The Halpern court reasoned that although “certain 
credit activities did not fall within the scope of . . . [the statute] because ‘banking’ at the time of 
Confederation did not include these activities. . . . the term ‘banking’ is not confined to the 
extent and kind of business actually carried on by banks in Canada in 1867.” Id. at ¶ 44. Halpern 
similarly held that the term “marriage” did not “have a constitutionally fixed meaning  . . . . [but 
r]ather, like the term ‘banking’ . . . and the phrase ‘criminal law’. . . the term ‘marriage’ . . . has 
the constitutional flexibility necessary to meet changing realities of . . . society.” Id. at ¶ 46. 
 132. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969. 
 133. See supra  notes 128–29; see also Goodridge , 798 N.E.2d at 961 (rejecting the argument 
that a “state’s interest in regulating marriage is based on the traditional concept that marriage’s 
primary purpose is procreation”).  
 134. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968 (“[The] justifications for the civil marriage restriction 
[offered by the State] are starkly at odds with the comprehensive network of vigorous, gender-
neutral laws promoting stable families and the best interests of children.”). In its acceptance of 
third-party effects as a rational basis for state regulation of marriage and as a reason to include 
same-sex partnerships within the newly expanded definition of marriage, Goodridge is 
consistent with Posner’s “moral indifference” standard. See supra note 20 (discussing the role 
this moral indifference standard plays in Posner’s economic theory). 
 135. On the other hand, to subordinate the companionate aspect to the procreative aspect 
would effectively eliminate the companionate principle altogether; the procreative-economic 
interest, in its fullest capacity, carries implications of self-effacement, subordination, and 
dependence, as opposed to self-fulfillment in an (ideal) companionate-based relationship of 
equals. See supra Part I.A (discussing examples of such dependence in the procreative model). 
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legalizing  polygamy.136 However, upon closer examination, the fallacy 
of this assertion comes to light. The “third-party effects” of 
polygamous relationships on both women and children distinguish 
polygamy from same-sex marriage.137 Those who speculate about the 
desirability of plural marriages ignore these third-party effects, which 
are not found in same-sex partnerships.138 Moreover, polygamous 
relationships have historically exalted the procreative purpose of 
marriage.139 In light of the high value modern U.S. culture places on 
individual autonomy and equality, the cornerstones of the 
companionate ideal of marriage, it is unlikely that polygamy could be 
legalized under the same individuality-focused rationale of Lawrence 
or Goodridge because polygamy tends to be premised on 
dependence, inequality, and even subordination. 
 
 136. Such an assertion could be based on Goodridge’s periodic use of language derived from 
equal protection jurisprudence, even though the holding is not premised on the constitutional 
principle of equal protection alone. 
 137. See Child Protection Project at http://www.childpro.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2005) 
(reporting on child abuse within religious institutions, especially those that endorse polygamy); 
see also John Dougherty, Polygamists Probed, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, May 1, 2003, at 11, 
available at http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/issues/2003-05-01/news/news.html; Special Report: 
Prosecuting Polygamy, at http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special45/ (last visited Apr. 16, 
2005) (reporting  the efforts of Arizona and Utah authorities to combat institutionalized 
domestic violence and child abuse in polygamous communities); cf. Utah Attorney General’s 
Office & Arizona Attorney General’s Office, The Primer—Helping Victims of Domestic 
Violence and Child Abuse in Polygamous Communities, at http://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/ 
polygamy/The_Primer.pdf (last updated July 2005) (providing “basic information about various 
polygamous communities that will assist human services professionals, law enforcement officers 
and others in helping victims from these communities”). 
 138. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Technical Report: Co-Parent or Second-Parent 
Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 341, 343 (Feb. 2002) (citing “evidence gathered 
during several decades using diverse samples and methodologies . . . [as] demonstrating that 
there is no systematic difference between gay and nongay parents . . . . [nor] any risk to children 
as a result of growing up in a family with 1 or more gay parents.”); American Psychological 
Association, Lesbian and Gay Parenting: A Resource for Psychologists (1995), at 
http://www.apa.org/pi/parent.html (“Not a single study has found children of gay or lesbian 
parents to be disa dvantaged in any significant respect relative to children of heterosexual 
parents. Indeed, the evidence . . . suggests that home environments provided by gay and lesbian 
parents are as likely as those provided by heterosexual parents to support and enable children’s 
psychosocial growth.”). 
 139. Polygamy may promote procreation to the point that it threatens the well-being of the 
children thus produced. See generally The Center for Public Education and Information on 
Polygamy, at http://www.polygamyinfo.com (last updated Aug. 23, 2005). 
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CONCLUSION 
For almost two centuries, Western culture has promoted two 
competing ideals of the purpose of marriage, one based on 
procreative, communitarian values, and the other based on 
companionship and individual fulfillment. This combination of ideals 
has produced policies that heavily regulate individual sexual behavior 
according to a narrow normative definition of “marriage.” In 
response to the assertion that expanding civil marriage to include 
same-sex partnerships will ultimately lead to state-sanctioned 
polygamy, this Note has argued that this is unlikely because polygamy 
is based on values that are antithetical to the ideals driving this 
redefinition. 
Polygamous relationships can be distinguished from dyadic 
heterosexual and same-sex relationships on the basis of underlying 
values and ideals. Whereas polygamy is rooted in an economic-
dependency model of marriage, same-sex marriage is based on the 
more recently developed ideal of marriage as a means of furthering 
individual fulfillment. Although Western culture has historically 
embraced aspects of both these models, the normative ideal of 
marriage is presently undergoing a metamorphosis driven by recent 
changes in the relative economic equality of men and women. As a 
result, the normative weight accorded the companionate purpose of 
hybrid marriage in the West has increased and the procreative-
economic purpose has diminished. In the U.S., this progression 
toward, and growing acceptance of, the purely-companionate model 
is reflected in the rationales of recent cases that invoke 
companionate-model values of individuality and mutuality in human 
relationships. In light of such evidence signaling the move away from 
the hybrid model and toward a companionate ideal, expanding civil 
marriage to include same-sex couples is unlikely to lead to 
legalization of polygamy. 
